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DOROTHY NIPPERT, Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
CITY OF RICHMOND, Defendant in Error. 
PETITION FOR 'WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable Judges of the Suprenie Court of Appeals: 
Your petitioner, Dorothy Nippert., respectfully represents 
that she is aggrieved by a judgment in the Hustings Court of 
the City of Richmond, Virginia, entered against her on th~ 
16th day of June, 1944. 
A transcript of the record of the said cause is presented 
herewith, and as a part of this petition, from an inspection ot 
which the following facts hereinafter assigned and complained 
of are made apparent: \ 
Your petitioner was employed as a solicitor for the Ameri· 
can Garment Company, which is owned and operated by John 
V. Rosser and bas its office at 3617 12th Street, Northeast; 
Washington, D. C. . 
The American Garment Company employs solicitors who 
travel from city to city, throughout the country, obtaining or· 
ders for certain ladies' g·arments. A down payment is re, 
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quired from the purchaser in an amount which is usually suf-
ficient to pay the commission of the solicitor, and the 
2* order is then sent to *\Vashington, D. C., and the garment 
is then sent by the American Garment Company to the 
purchaser throug·b the United States mails, C. 0. D. The 
solicitor at no time makes a delivery of the article, and the 
only compensation paid the solicitor is the amount received 
by way of commission. 
Your petitioner, on January 20, 1944, was so soliciting or-
ders in the City of Richmond, and on that day was arrested 
rind charged with unlawfully engaging in Richmond in the 
business of a solicitor without having procured a City license 
assessable under Section 23 of Chapter 10 of the Richmond 
City Code of 1937 (R., p. 1). 
On the 22nd day of ,J mmary,, 1944, your petitioner was tried . 
in the Police Court of the City of Richmond and fined $25.00 
and costs and ordered to purchase a city license in accordance 
with the above cited ordinance, and your petitioner appealed 
to the Hustings Court, where the case came on for hearing on 
nn agreed statement of fact (R., pp. 7-8) and found guilty as 
charg·ed, and a fine of $5.00 and costs assessed against her, 
and a motion to set aside the judgment as contrar~r to the law 
and the evidence was denied and an exception noted. 
,Vhile the record (R., pp. 5-6) contains the ordinances re-
ferred to at the trial, the only one that is material to this ap-
peal is the following;: 
· '' Chapter 10, Section 23.-Agents-Solicitors-Persons, 
Firms or Corporations engaged in business as solicitors * * * 
$50.00 and one-half of one per centum of the gross earnings, 
receipts., fees or commissions for the preceding· license year in 
excess of $1,000.00. Permit of Director of Public Safety re-
quired before license will be issued. (December 15, 1933.)" 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS. 
1. The Court erred in holding that the City had the au-
thority to pass the ordinance in question. 
2. The Court erred in refusing to hold that the ordi-
31' nance, *insofar as it referred to petitioner, was in con-
flict with the commerce clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion. 
3. The Court erred in holding· that petitioner had violated 
the law in soliciting· orders in interstate commerce without 
having procured a city license as a solicitor. 
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QUESTION PRESENTED. 
3 
vVhether the order, under which your pet:tioner was con-
victed, which required that she obtain a license for the privi-
lege of soliciting orders in the City of Richmond for a for-
eign firm, was unconstitutional and a violation of the peti. 
tioner 's rights under the Federal Constitution. 
ARGUMENT. 
The record in this case clearly presents to this Court for 
its decision the question as to whether or not a person known 
as a solicitor or drummer, having no fixed place of business, 
and soliciting .orders for a foreign firm, can be required by 
the City of Richmond to pay $50.00 for a license for the privi-
lege of soliciting such orders. · 
This particular question has been presented to this Court 
on numerous occasions and to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, and it has been held at all times that the City 
could not require such a license for the privilege of soliciting 
orders. • 
In the Case of Robbins v. Shelby Coitnty Taxing District, 
120 U. S. 489., Robbins was found guilty of soliciting without 
having first obtained a license as required by the Statute in 
force in Shelby Taxing District, which contained, among 
other thing·s, the following: 
'' All drummers, and all persons not having a regular li-
censed house of business in the Taxing District, offering for 
Rale or selling goods, wares, or merchandise therein, by 
sample, shall be required to pay to the county trustee 
4 * *the sum of $10 per week, or $25 per month, for such 
privilege., and no license shall be issued for a longer pe· 
riod than three months.'' 
Robbins was soliciting orders for the firm of ''Rose, Rob-
bins & Co." of Cincinnati, and Robbins contended that the 
law imposing the tax was repugnant to that clause of the 
Constitution of the United States which dechres that Con· 
gTess shall have power to regulate commerce among the sev-
eral states. 
The Court, among other things, commencing at Page 496, 
stated as follows: 
"But it will be said that a denial of this power of taxation 
will interfere with the rigllt of the state to tax business pur-
suits and callings carried on within its limits, and its rights 
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to require licenses for carrying on those which are declared 
to be privileges. This may be true to a certain extent; but 
only in those cases in which the states themselves, as well as 
individual citizens, are subject to the restraints of the higher 
law of the Constitution. And this interference will be very 
limited in its operation. It will only prevent the levy of a 
tax, or the requirement of a license, for making negotiations 
.in the conduct of interstate commerce; and it may well be 
asked where the state gets authority for imposing burdens on 
that branch of business any more than for imposing a tax 
on the business of importing- from foreign countries, or even 
on that of postmaster or U~1ited States marshal. The mere 
calling the business of a drummer a privilege cannot make it 
so. Can the state legislature make it a Tennessee privilege to 
carry on the business of importing· goods from foreign coun-
tries 1 If not., has it any bettci· right to make it a state privi-
lege to carry on interstate commerce? It seems to be for-
gotten, in argument., that the people of this country are citi-
zens of the United States, as well as of the individual states~ 
and that thev have some rights under the Constitution and 
laws of the former indepeu·clent of the latter, and free from 
any interference or 1·estraint from them.'' 
and then ag·ain, commencing on Page 497, is the following·: 
''It is strongly urged, as if it were a material point in the 
case, that no discrimination is made between domestic and 
foreig·n drummers-those of Tennessee and those of other 
states; that all are taxed alike. But that does not meet the 
difficulty. Interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even 
though the same amount of tax should be laid on domestic 
commerce, or that which is carried on solely witl1in the state. 
This was decided in the case of Th.e State Freight Tax, 15 
Wall. 232. The negotiation of sales of goods which are in 
another state, for the purpose of introducing· them into the 
state in which the negotiation is made, is interstate com-
merce. A New Orleans merchant cannot be taxed there 
5* for ordering· *goods from London or New York, because. 
in the one case, it is an act of foreign, and in the othGr of 
interstate commerce, both of which are subject to regulation 
by Congress alone.'' 
and then again at Page 498 is the following·: 
''If the sellin~ of g·oods by sample and the employment of 
drummers for that purpose, injuriously affect the local in-
terest of the states, Oong-ress, if applied to, will undoubtedly 
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make such reasona.ble re2;uhtions as the case mav demand. 
And Cong-ress alone can d'o it; for it is obvious that "such regu-
lations should be based on a uniform system applicable to t'.10 
whole country., and not left to the varied, discordant, or re-
taliatory enactments of forty different states. The confusion 
into which the commerce of the country would be thrown by 
being subject to state legislation on this subject, would be but 
a repetition of the disorder which prevailed under the Ar-
ticles of Confederation. 
"To say that the tax, if invalid as against drummers from 
other states, operates as a discrimination ag;ainst the drum-
mers of Tennessee, against wl10m it is conceded to be valid, is 
no argument; because, the state is not bound to tax its own 
drummers; and if it does so whilst having no power to tax 
those of other states~ it acts of its own free will, and is itself 
the author of such discrimination. As before said, the state 
may tax its own internal commerce; but that does not give it 
any right to tax interstate commerce.'' 
This same question was again before the Supreme Court of 
the United States in the case of Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., 
v. City of Portland, 268 U. S. 325, in which case the farts dis-
close that the Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., was an Illinois 
corporation emrnged in manufacturing silk hosiery at In-
dianapolis, Indiana, and selling it tl1roughont the United 
States to consumers only. It employed two thousand repre-
sentatives who solicit orders in most of the important cities 
and towns throughout the United States. The City of Port-
land passed an ordinance which required that every person 
who goes from ph~ce to place taking· orders for g·oods for 
future delivery and receives payment or any deposit of money 
in advance shall secure a license ancl file a bond. 
The appellant filed a bill in the United States Distr~ct 
Court for Oreg·on challenging- the ordinance and a skin-~ 
6* that its ""enforcement be restrained upon the ground, 
among others, that it interfered with and burdens inter-
state commeree and was repugnant to Article 1. Section 8 of 
the Federal Constitution. T11e Trial Court dismissed the 
bill. 
The Court, at Page 335, said: 
'' Considering former opinions of this eo,ut we cannot 
doubt that the ordinance materiallv burdens interstat~ com-
merce and conflicts with the Commerce Cla1,se. Robbins v. 
8helb11 Taxin,q Distrfot, 120 U. S. 489. 497. * * • · 
. " 'The negotiation of sales of goods which are in 11nothP.r 
State., for the purpose of introducing them into the State in 
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which the negotiation is made, is interstate commerce.' Mani-
festly, no license fee could have been required of appellant's 
solicitors if they had travelled at its expense and received 
· their compensation by direct remittances from it. And we 
are unable to see that the burden on interstate commerce is 
different or less because they are paid throug·h retention of 
advance partial payments made under definite contracts ne-
gotiated by them. Nor can we accept the theory that an ex-
pressed purpose to prevent possible frauds is enoug·h to jus-
tify legislation which really interferes with the free flow of 
legitimate interstate commerce. See Shafer v. Farmrrs Grain 
Co., 268 U.S. 1.89. 
'' The decree of the court below must be reversed. The 
cause will be remanded to the District Court for fmther pro-
eeedings in harmony with this opinion.'' 
Tl1e City of Richmond, in the lower Court, relied upon the 
case of Dwnston v. City of Norfolk, 177 Va. 689, 15 S. E. (2nd) 
86, but it is submitted that this case was based upon an en-
tirely different ordinance and upon a very different statement 
of facts, for in that case Dunston had a fixed place of busi-
ness, and the license referred to required only that a tax be 
paid, based upon the amount of the sales made bv him or in 
the business during· the calendar year ending· with the 31st 
day of December next preceding. It did not require a license 
before orders were to be solicited. This Court in the Dunston 
case refei:red at length to the case of McGoldrick v. Berwind-
White Coal Mi·1iing Co., 309 U. S. 33, 60 Sup. Ct. 388, and 
T'f.: cited at length from the opinion *in that case, and which 
reiterated its stand in the case of Robbins v. Shelby 
County Taxing District, suvra, in the following language: 
" 'It is also urged that the conclusion which we reach is 
inconsistent with the long· line of decisions of this Court fol-
lowing· Robbins v. ShelbJt Countv Taxin.Q District, 120 U. S. 
489, 7 S. Ct. 592, 30 L. Ed. 694 (1 Inters. Com. Rep. 45) which 
have held invalid license taxes to the extent that thev have 
sought to tax the occupation of soliciting· orders for the pur-
chase of g·oods to be shipped into the taxing state. In some 
instances the tax appeared to be aimed at suppression or 
placing at a disadvantage this type of business when brought 
into competition with competing intrastate sales. ( Cases 
cited) In all, the statute, in its practical operation, was 
capable of use, through increase in the tax, and in fact op-
ctated to some extent to place the merchant thus doing busi-
ness interstate at a disadvanta!?;e in competition with un-
taxed sales at retail stores within the state. While a state., 
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in some circumstances may, by taxation suppress or curtail 
one type of intrastate business to the advantage of another 
type of competing business ,vhich is left untaxed ( cases cit9d): 
it does not follow that interstate commerce may be similarly 
affected by the practical operation of a state taxing statute. 
( Cases cited.) It is enough for present purposes that tho 
rule . of Robbins v. Shelby Coun.ty Taxing Dist. (120 U. S. 
489, 7 S. Ct. 592, 30 L. Ed. 694, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 45), supra, 
has been narrowly limited to fixed-sum license taxes imposed 
on the business of soliciting orders for the purchase of goods 
to be shipped interstate. (Cases cited) • • *' (309 U. S. 33, 
60 S. Ct. 391, 84 L. Ed. 565, 128 A. L. R. 876. '' 
And the Court then went 011 and distinguished between the 
Berwind-White case and the Dunston case in the following lan-
guage: 
"The.decision in the Berwind-"'\Vhite Coal Mining Company 
case, supra, was made in connection with a sales tax based 
orrthe amount of the sales made. The sale contracts were en-
tered into in New York City, and the delivery of the mer-
chandise was made in that city. The instant case is in con-
nection with a privilege tax-a tax measured by the amount 
of sales made by the taxpayer. The sales were negotiated 
in Norfolk and tliere consummated by a transfer of title or 
delivery of possession. Both the Berwind-White Coal l\Iin-
ing Company and Dunston had a fixed place of business in 
their respective cities. A non-discriminatory privilege tax 
has no different effect upon interstate commerce than a sales 
tax or a use tax. Each adds to the ultimate cost to the pur-
chaser. That the tax is paid in one instance by the purchaser, 
nnd in the other by the vendor does not affect the interstate 
or intrastate phase of the transaction.,, 
8* *The counsel for the City of Richmond also relied upon 
the case of Chri.rdian Co·rporation v. The Commonwealth 
of Virginia and the City of Hiclinwnd, tried in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Richmond, and in which case a writ of 
error was denied by this Court on the 8th day of October, 
1941. 
Thereafter a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Su-
preme Court of the United States was filed and denied by that 
Court but it is contended that the Christian Corporation case 
may be easily distinguished from the present case. The 
Christian Corporation was a Virgfoia corporation with its 
principal office and place of business in the City of Richmond, 
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and it was required to pay a tax on the business of the preced-
ing year, even though it~ income was from business obtained 
throug·h interstate commerce, and the City of Richmond and 
the Commonwealth of Virginia 1'.clied upon the Dunston case 
to support its right to assess such taxes, and no question was 
raised in either case covering the requirement that a person 
obtain a license prior to soliciting orders in interstate com-
merce, and the City of Richmond and the Commonwealth of 
Virginia in their brief., which was filed in the Christian Cor-
poration case in opposition to the petition for a writ of 
certiorari, on Pag·e 7 stated as follows: 
'' But a State license as a commission merchant is onlY re-
quired where such merchant has established a dei}nite 1;lace 
of business, section 131 of the 'rax Code of Virginia (Acts of 
Assembly 1928, p. 97) providing that 'every license granting 
authority to engage in * * * nny husiness * * * shall designate 
the place of such business * ,i, ~·i at some specified J10use or 
other definite place within the county or city ,)I< * *.' There 
is no ·state license required of m1 itinerant solicitor of orders 
in a city or town with 110 place of business therein (such as a 
drummer) and consequently section 296 of the Tax Code does 
not afford any authoritv for the assessment of a local license 
in such a case.'' .. 
Your petitioner in this case is in a similar position with 
the' petitioner in the case of M1trdock v. ComrnonweaUh 
9* of * PennBylva.nia, 319 U. S. 105, 63 Sup. Ct. Rep. 870, 
and the Court in that case, at pag·e 112, stated as follows: 
"It is oue thinp; to imn·ose a tax on the income or property 
of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from 
him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. The tax im-
posed hy the City of ,Jeannette iR a flat license tax, the pay-
ment of which is a condition of the exercise of these constitu-
tional privileges. The pow·er to tax the exercise of a privi-
lege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. Maq-
nano Co. v. Hmnilton, 292 U. S. 40, 44, 45, 54 S. Ct. 599, 60t, 
78 L. Eel. 1109, and cases cited. Those who can tax the exer-
cise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly 
as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its mainte-
nance.*** 
"It is contended, ho,vever, that the fact that the license tax 
can suppress or control this activity is unimportant if it does 
not do so. But that is to disi·egarcl the nature of this tax. It 
is a license tax-a flat tax im1)osecl on the exercise of a privi-
leg:e gTantccl b:v- tl1e Bill of Rip;llh,. A state may not impose 
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a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal 
constitution. Thus., it may not exact a license tax for the privi-
lege of carrying on interstate commerce CJJicGold1·ick v. Ber-
wind-White Co., 309 U. S. 33, 56-58, 60 S. Ct. 388, 397, 398~ 84 
L. Ed. 565, 128 A. L. R 876), although it may tax the prop-
erty used in, OJ.' the income derived from, that commerce, so 
long as those taxes are not discriminatory. Id .. , 309 U. S., at 
page 47, 60 S. Ct., at page 392, 84 L. Ed. 565, 128 .A. L. R. 876 
mid cases cited. .A license tax applied to activities guaranteed 
by the First Amendment would have the same destructive ef-
fect. It is true that the First Amendment, like the commerce 
clause, draws no distinction between license taxes, 'fixed sum 
taxes, and other kinds of taxes. But that is no reason why 
we should shut our eyes to &he nature of the tax and its de-
structive influence. The power to impose a license tax on the 
exercise of these freedoms is indeed as potent as the power 
of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down.'' 
Your petitioner, under the circumstances, does not feel that 
she should be required to pay $50.00 for a license for the privi-
~ege of soliciting orders in the City of Richmond for a for-
~ign firm, and it is prayed that a writ of error may be awarded 
her to the said judgment and that the same may be reviewed, 
reversed and remanded to the Hustings Court of the City of 
Richmond, with proper directions. 
It is the desire of your petitioner to state or~lly the rea-
sons for reviewing· this decision, and, in the event a writ of 
error be awarded, to adopt tpis petition as her brief. 
10* * .A copy of this petition being for,,1arded by Regis-
tered Mail to Henry R. Miller, tT r., Esquire, Assistant 
City .Attorney, 402 City Hall, Richmond, Virg'inia., this 17th 




by CORNELIUS H. DOHERTY, 
CORNELIUS H. DOHERTY, 
471.9 North Rock Spring Road, 
Arlington., Virginia, 
Attorney for Petitioner. 
.Attorney. 
1 O Supreme Court of A ppeais of Virginia 
I, the undersigned counsel, practicing in the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that in my opinion 
there is an error apparent on the face of the record of the 
judgment in this case, for which the same should be reviewed 
and reversed. 
CORNELIUS H. DOHERTY, 
Attorney for Petitioner ... 
Received July 18, 1944. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
Writ of error granted. Bond,,$300.00. 
GEORGE L. BROWNING. 
8-23-44. 
Received August 23, 1944. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
M:. B. w. 
In the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond. 
City of Richmond 
v. 
Dorothy Nippert 
Before Hon. John L. Ingram, Judge, Ric11mond, Virginia~ 
June 16, 1944. · 
page 1 ~ City of Rich~ond, to-wit: 
To all or any of the Police Officers of the City of Richmond: 
Whereas, R. L. Beasley and H. H. Meeks have this day 
made complaint and information on oath before me, Carleton 
E. ,Jewett, Substitute Police Justice of said city, that on the 
2oth day of January, 1944, at said City of Richmond Dorothy 
Nippert did unlawfully engage in Richmond in the business 
of a solicitor wit11out having procured a City license assess-
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able under Section 23 of Chapter 10 of the Richmond City 
Code of 1937. 
These are., therefore, in the name of the City of Richmond, 
to command you forthwith to apprehend and bring before 
me, or some other Justice of the Peace of the said city, the 
body of the said Dorothy Nippert to answer said complaint, 
and to be further dealt with according to law. 
And, moreover, upon the arrest of the said Dorothy Nip-
pert by virtue of this warrant, I command .you in the name of 
the City of Richmond to summon R. L. Beasley, H. H. Meeks, 
Mr. Perriott c/o Miller & Rhoads, Inc. and C. V. Werne, clo 
Better Business Bureau to appear at the Police Justice's 
Court, as witnesses to testify in behalf of the City of Rich-
mond against the said Dorothy Nippert on the 22nd day of 
January,, 1944. And have then and there this warrant, with 
vour return thereon. 
.. Given under my hand and seal this 22nd day of January, 
1944. 
CARLETON E. JEWETT, 
Substitute Police Justice (Seal) 
A copy teste : 
L. A. SCHUMANN, 
Deputy Clerk. 
(On Back) 
In the Police Court 
1/22/44 Richmond, Va. 
Fine $25.00 and cost and ordered to purchase City License, 
as provided by Section 23, Chapter 10, Richmond City Code 
of 1937. Appeal noted. 
A copy teste : 
C.A.RLETON E. JEWETT, 
Suh. Police Justice 
Richmond, Virginia 
L. A. SCHUMANN, 
Deputy Clerk. 
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Executed by arresting the within-named 
And summoning the within-named witn~sses 
Form C-124 
In Police Justice's Court City of Richmond 
Jan. 22, 1944. 
This is to certify that the within named Dorothy Nippert, 
was this day tried by me for the charge set forth within this 
warrant, and that upon said trial she, the said Dorothy Nip-
pert was duly convicted of the within charge and ordered to , 
purchase city license to pay a fine of $25.00 dollars and costs 
......... dollars, from which sentence she, the said Dorothy ' 
Nippert appeals to the next term of Hustings Court . 
. Given und~r my hand this 22 day of Jan., 1944. 
A copy teste : 
C. E. JEWETT, 
Police Justice. 
L. A. SCHUMANN, 
Deputy Clerk. 
page 2 ~ Commonwealth of Virginia, 
City of Richmond., to-wit: 
Pleas at the Courthouse in the City Hall, before the 
Hustings Court of the said City, on the 11th day of July, 
1944. 
Be it remembered that at another day, to-wit; at the same 
Hustings Court, held at the Courthouse of said City, in the 
City Hall, on the 16th day of June~ 1944, the following order 
was entered, to-wit: 
City of Richmond 
v. 
Dorothy Nippert, Dft. 
Dorothy Nippert v. City of Richmond 
.APPEAL. 
13 
The said defendant this day appeared and was set to the 
bar in the custody of tl;le Sergeant of this City, and being ar-
raigned pleaded not guilty of unlawfully engaging in Rich-
mond in the business of a solicitor without having procured a 
City license assessable under Section 23 of Chapter 10 of the 
Richmond City Code of 1937, as charged. And with the con-
sent of the accuse(l, given in person, and the concurrence of 
the Court and the Attorney fo1· the City of Richmond, the 
Court proc~eded to hear and determine this case without a 
jury. And having heard the evidence doth find the said de-
fendant. guilty as charged and assess her fine at Five Dollars. 
·whereupon it is considered by the Court that the satd 
Dorothy Nippert pay and satisfy a fine of Five Dollars and 
costs. .And thereupon the said defendant, by counsel., moved 
the Court to set the said judgment aside as contrary to the 
la,,· and the evidence, which motion the Court doth overrule, 
and the defendant excepts, and time is allowed her, not to 
exceed sixty days from this day, in which to file her bills of 
exceptions. And -thereupon, on the defendanfs motion, the 
Court doth suspend the execution of said judgment 
pag·e 3 } until the 6th day of November, 19#, in order that 
the said defendant may apply to the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia for a writ of error and sitpersedeas, 
and the said defendant is recognized to make her personal 
appearance in this Court on the said 6th day of November, 
1944. . 
A copy teste : 
pag·e 4 ~ Virginia : 
L. A. SCHUMANN, 
Deputy Clerk. 
In the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond. 
And now at this day, to-wit: At a like Hustings Court, 
held in tbe Courthouse in the City Hall of said Citv on the 
llth day of .July, 1944, bein~ the same day and year first here-
inbefore written, the following order was entered, to-wit: 
City of Richmond 
v. 
Dorothy Nippert, Dft.· 
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APPEAL.· 
The transcript of the testimony and ordinances in the 
above causei, having been received by the Court on the 11th 
day of July, 1944, was this day signed and sealed by the Court 
and delivered to the Clerk of this Court, and is hereby made a 
part of the record in this cause. 
A copy. teste: 
page 5 ~ City of Richmond 
v. 
Dorothy Nippert, Dft. 
L. A. SCHUMANN, 
Deputy Clerk. 
ORDINANCES AND FACTS ADDUCED AT TRIAL. 
Chapter 10, Section 4.-There shall be levied and collected 
for the calendar year 1931 and each calendar year thereafter, 
the following license taxes, to-wit: (December 24, 1930.) 
Chapter 10. Section 23.-Agents-Solicitors-Perso'us, 
Firms or Corporations engaged in business as solicitors ..... 
$50.00 and one-half of one per centum of the gross earnings11 
receipts, fees or -co~niissions for the preceding license year 
in excess of $1,000.00. Permit of Director of Public Safety 
required before license will be issued. (December 15, 1933.) 
Chapter 10, Section 166%.-PERMITS OF DIRECTOR 
OF PUBLIC SA·FETY REQUIRED FOR CERTAIN LI-
CENSES.-( a) Every person, firm and corporation desiring· 
a license under sections 14, 16, .23, 94, 120 and 143., of this 
chapter shall first apply to the Director of Public Safety for 
a permit on behalf of said individual, firm or corporation, as 
the case may be, to conduct the business which is desired to 
be conducted and shall produce to that D~rector evidence of 
the good character of the individual, the members of the firm, 
or the chief officers of the corporation, as the case m~y be, 
and it shall thereupon be the duty of the Director of Public 
Safety to make a reasonable investigation of the character 
of said individual, each of the members of the firm, or each 
of the chief officers of the corporation, as the case mav be, 
and if he be satisfied that the individual, the members of the 
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:firm or the principal officers of the Corporation, as 
page 6 ~ the case may be, be of good moral character and a 
person or persons fit to engag·e in the proposed· 
business, he shall issue the permit. The form of the applica-
tion for such permit and the form of the permit itself shall 
be prepared and furnished by the Director of Public Safety. 
(b} Every person, firm and corporation desiring a license 
under sections 25., 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40 or 42 
shall apply to the Director of Public Safety for a p~rmit to 
conduct the desired business and furnish evidence to that 
Director that the house, building, structure, or room in which 
the proposed business is to be conducted is a suitable place to 
conduct said business and has facilities for escape in case of 
fire and is sufficiently strong and safe and otherwise complies 
with the building· code of the City of Richmond and it shall 
thereupon be the duty of the Director of Public Safety to make 
a reasonable investigation of the facts in connection with 
such application and to cause the building inspector of the 
City of Richmond to make an inspection and report as to the 
condition of the premises and the compliance thereof with the 
building code of the City of Richmond. If the Director of 
Public Safety be satisfied that the premises are strong and 
safe and otherwise comply with the building code he shall 
issue the desired permit. The form of application for such 
permit and the form of the permit itself shall be prepared and 
furnished by the Director of Public Safety. (January 5, 
1944). 
A copy teste : 
L. A. SCHUMANN, 
Deputy Clerk. 
page 7 r The American Garment Company, which is owned 
and operated by .John V. Rosser, with its main of-
fice at 3617 12th Street, N. E., ·washington, D. C., is engap:ed 
in the manufacture and sale of certain ladies' garments. The 
American Garment ComJ>any employs solicitors who travel 
from City. to City throughout the country and obtain orders 
for this particular garment; which is sol9. for $2.98, and the 
solicitor receives from the purchaser a down payment usually 
~ufficient to pay the commission of the solicitor, and the order 
is then sent to the home office of the American Garment Com-
pany and the garment is then sent through the United States 
mails C. O. D. for the balance to the purchaser. The solicitors 
at_ no time make a delivery of the article. 
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The defendant herein was not and is not carried on the-
rolls of the American Garment Company as an employee and 
her sole compensation is the commission received from the 
sale of each article. 
The defendant., Dorothy Nippert, on January 20, 1944, was 
soliciting orders for the American Garment Company, as 
above set forth, in the City of Richmond, and that Dorothy 
Nippert had been engaged for four days prior to January 
20, 1944, in going· from place to place in the City of Richmond 
and in soliciting orders for the sale of merchandise on behalf 
of the American Garment Company and had, during that 
time, been engaged in going from place to place within the 
· places of business of Miller & Rhoads, Incorporated, a large 
department store in the City of Richmond and within the 
place of business of one of the Five and Ten Cent Stores in 
the City of Richmond, and therein soliciting the Clerks in 
those stores so as to procure from those Clerks orders for the 
sale of merchandise on behalf of the American Garment Com-
pany, and that such solicitation occurred on the 
page 8 ~ 20th of January, 1944., and that she, the said Dorothy 
Nippert, had not therefore procured a City revenue 
. license from the City of Richmond. 
JUDGE'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, John L. Ingram, Judge of the Hustings Court of the City 
of Richmond, Virginia, who presided over the trial of the 
case of City of Richmond 1.1. Dorothy Nippert, on June 16, 
1944, do certify that the testimony included in the foregoing 
transcript was before me for consideration in the trial of said 
case. 
And I further certify that the Attorney for the City of 
Rfol1mond was given reasonable notice, in writing, of the time 
and place at which this certificate was to be tendered. 
Given under my hand this 11th day of July, 1944. 
JOHN L. INGRAM, 
Judge of the Hustings Court of the City 
of Richmond~ Virginiaoc 
A copy teste : 
L.A. SCHUMANN, 
Deputy Clerk. 
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pag·e 9 ~ I, L. A. Schumann, Deputy Clerk of the Hustings 
Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, do hereby 
certify that the foregoing transcript, duly authenticated and 
certifietl by the J udg·e of said Court,, was delivered to me on 
tl1e 11th day of July, 1944. 
Given under my hand this 11th day of July, 1944. 
L. A. SCHUMANN, 
Deputy Clerk, Hustings Court of the 
City of Richmond. 
I, L. A. Schumann, Deputy Clerk of the Hustings Court of 
the City of Richmond, Virginia, do certify that the foregoing· 
is a true and correct transcript of the record in the c3:se of 
City of Richmond v. Dorothy Nippert; and I do further certify 
tliat counsel of record for the Citv of Richmond had due no-
tice of the intention of counsel fo1; the defendant to apply for 
the said transcript before the same was made out and ten-
dered. 
Given under my band this 11th day of ,July, 1944. 
L. A. SCHUMANN, 
Deputy Clerk, Hustings Court of the 
City of Richmond. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M:. B. W A.TTS, C. C. 
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